Privacy Versus Disclosure in Gamete Donation: A Clash of Interest, of Duties, or an Exercise in Responsibility?
The privacy versus disclosure debate is one of the main issues of controversy in assisted reproduction with donor gametes, centered around the traditional anonymity, if not secrecy, of the procedure (1) . It has been argued that it is designed to protect the adults involved, either the prospective parents, especially the male partner in the case of donor insemination (DI) (2) , or even the intermediaries, donors, and practitioners (3), rather than the prospective child, toward whom ail parties share responsibility. Thus debates about anonymity of the donation and secrecy of the procedure have often overlapped, while these issues bear more than a semantic difference (4) .
In Europe, the majority of prospective parents still choose secrecy as to the means of conception after gamete donation (5) . This necessarily entails reciprocal anonymity, a practice which has been the cornerstone of the Code of practice of the French Center pour 1'Etude et ta Conservation des Eoufs et du Sperme (CECOS), founded 21 years ago, and an example often quoted as the first organized nationwide program of gamete donation.
This same principle is now enshrined in the new French Bioethics legislation passed in July 1994 (6) , as it is already in Denmark and Spain, while in the United Kingdom, anonymity is preferred but not compulsory. This is to be contrasted with Sweden, which enacted its legislation in 1985, making it mandatory to use sperm donors who give an implied undertaking of a degree of responsibility by agreeing to their identification when the resulting child would be 18 years old.
In the late 1980's, a consequentialist argument concerning the supply of donors was made, linking the initial decline of sperm donors seen in Sweden soon after the law was passed to the concern of potential donors and future paternity claims. Recent evidence, however, seems to indicate that a more mature group of donors is being recruited and that, at least at the centers studied, the recruitment of donors has been increasing (7) .
This Swedish experiment may be reassuring with regard to the bearing of disclosure on the supply of sperm donors, although national figures are not available. However, uncertainty remains about the interest of the potential child. It will be argued that we lack evidence in this field and that one should not therefore dogmatically impose an extreme attitude of either total secrecy or total openness, when we consider the "welfare of the child," a duty enshrined in English legislation (8) and detailed in the Code of Practice (9) evolved by its statutory authority, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA).
Part of the basis for the Swedish stance stems from arguments in favor of the "right" of the child to know his/her "origins." The very terminology of rights is inflexible, as they are bound to clash with other rights (10) . In the United Kingdom, the HFEA Code of Practice enjoins us to consider the potential "need" rather than "the right" of the child to "know of his/her origins," a more tolerant approach. Another argument for openness is the potentially divisive role of secrets in families. Secrets may arguably be damaging or at least dangerous in a family, especially if revealed in anger (11) .
The counterargument to disclosure is that the infringement on the privacy of the parents, already characteristic of most fertility treatments, does not need compounding by further societal demands to inform their offspring of his/her mode of procreation when this is not routinely imposed on all the families of natural procreation.
Furthermore, it is worth asking what is meant by the term "origin" (or parentage), which may or may not be kept secret from the child: it need not necessarily be interpreted as meaning biological parentage rather than legal or social, especially with a definition dating from a time when medicine and cryopreservation were not agents of separation of all these factors of filiation (12) .
Several studies have already shown that children conceived by "assisted reproduction" fare very well in the measured personal and social criteria, compared to children conceived "naturally" or adopted (13) . As such studies concern a sample of families where the majority of parents have chosen to rely on anonymity and secrecy in gamete donation or where it has been imposed by a Code of Practice, like in France, for instance, one would have to prove that children who are told the full details of their origins fare even better to convince all parties that it is the most responsible attitude.
With regard to secrecy as to the mode of conception, most publications show that a majority of couples at the recipient end of gamete donation, especially sperm donation, do not intend to reveal this to the child (2, 14) . Arguably, this may be because no alternative to anonymity has been offered, when such a course may be more easily available in oocyte donation.
Thus, although the trend may be changing in view of the recent more open attitude to male infertility, the evidence we have is that the majority is finding that secrecy is the path which the families involved choose, mostly at the start of treatment, and that the facts gathered on the "welfare of the child" are very reassuring. We lack prospective studies showing that people change their mind with the passage of years and the maturing of their children. We also lack, for further comparison, studies concerning children who have been told of their origins, in order to observe the effects of known donation on children.
With regard to parental concern for the anonymity of donation, there are many observed differences in attitudes in the respective cases of sperm and ovum donation, two procedures which question the psychosocial definitions of "father" and "mother" (15) . Anonymity is a tool that protects the social and psychological construct of the family resulting from gamete donation, especially enhancing the social paternal role of the male in the recipient couple in the case of sperm donation.
Its other function is to protect privacy, as it allows a couple to keep the "artificial" mean of conception of their child a secret if they so wish. This ought to be respected, as there is no evidence that it is deleterious to the child. We have no duty to convince prospective parents to choose otherwise, but should listen to their concerns. We may tell them that it is to be suspected that whatever stance is adopted by the parents, either to inform or not to inform the child, will actually lead to a good outcome for the child, in tune with the parental satisfaction of doing what is "right" for them.
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At a recent workshop in Australia, two young women in their 20s became very angry with a doctor, who they felt was not acknowledging theirs and others' needs and rights for information about the semen donors who contributed gametes for their conception. The emotions aroused were intense. The women are part of a growing number of,persons, having been told of the nature of their conception, who want to know why they cannot have information about the donor to which they feel they are entitled. Issues surrounding information sharing in gamete donation (GD) and its management is, in my view, the most controversial issue in assisted reproductive technology (ART). The growth in the numbers of offspring knowing of their gamete donation conception means that the controversy is set to escalate. The controversy has been portrayed in this journal as being about "privacy versus disclosure among patients .... " Two comments seem appropriate regarding this conceptualization of the issue. The first is that the words privacy and disclosure are presented as opposites, but of course neither is an absolute, there being degrees of privacy and degrees of disclosure. For example, parents do disclose the nature of GD conception to others but expect that privacy will be maintained--it has just been extended to a wider group (1). Joyce (2) has suggested that there are four degrees of openness in donor insemination (DI):(i) DI may be shared with chosen members of the family or close friends, (ii) there may be sharing of the DI conception with the child, (iii) there may be sharing with society in general, and (iv) the identity of the donor may be shared with the child and perhaps the family.
In earlier writings, I also portrayed the issue as opposites, using the terms secrecy and openness (1, 3) . As a result of the value connotations associated with these words, as well as in recognition of the complexity surrounding the topic, I now discuss the topic in terms of information sharing and information exchange (4, 5) , thus moving away from the presentation of the issue in either/or terms.
The second point relates to the use of the term "patients." It is to be expected that doctors will see the infertile couple (and increasingly the single woman) sitting in front of them as their patients; after all, the consultation is occurring because of
